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Judicial Method is "Alive and Well":
The Kentucky Approach to
Choice of Law in
Interstate Automobile Accidents
By ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
In Foster v. Leggett,' the Kentucky Court of Appeals again
had the occasion to consider what law should apply on the issue
of guest-host immunity in the case of the interstate automobile
accident. The problem is a recurring one in Kentucky and else-
where and arises in a variety of factual contexts.2 The previous
cases before the Kentucky Court involved parties who were resi-
dents of the same state and the accident occurred while they were
traveling in another state. In Foster v. Leggett, the parties were
* A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh, Professor of Law, University of Ken-
tucky.
1484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
2 Some 26 states have guest statutes, which require a showing of a greater
degree of negligence in a suit by a guest passenger against a host. See R. W=n,-
TRAUB, COMUMNTARY ON =HE CONFLaCT OF LAw 207 n.20 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as COMMENTARY]. Frequently a case will involve two residents of the same state who
were traveling in another state when the accident occurred. But since many people
live in functional socio-economic and mobility areas that cut across state lines, it is
equally possible that the parties will be residents of different states. This being so,
a case can present any of the following fact-law patterns: (1) two parties from a
recovery state are involved in an accident in an immunity state; (2) two parties
from an immunity state are involved in an accident in a recovery state; (3) the
plaintiff is from a recovery state, the defendant is from an immunity state, and the
accident occurs in the plaintiff's home state or another recovery state; (4) the
plaintiff is from a recovery state the defendant is from an immunity state, and
e accident occurs in the defendant's home state or another immunity state; (5)
the plaintiff is from an immunity state, the defendant is from a recovery state and
the accident occurs in the plaintiff's home state or another immunity state; and (6)
the plaintiff is from an immunity state, the defendant is from a recovery state,
and the accident occurs in the defendants home state or another recovery state.
Cases (3) and (6) have not yet appeared in reported opinions.
3 Wessling v. Paris 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Arnett v. Thompson, 433
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968). Prior to Arnett the conflicts torts cases coming before
the Kentucky Court of Appeals since 1950-the last case before that arose in 1940
-had involved the identical fact-law pattern of two Kentucky residents who were
involved in an accident in a guest statute state. See the discussion in Sedler,
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict
of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 65-70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Babcock v. Jack-
son in Kentucky].
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residents of different states and the accident occurred in the
driver's home state. The passenger was a Kentucky resident. The
driver resided in Portsmouth, Ohio,4 but, like the passenger, was
employed by the C. & 0. Railroad in Russell, Kentucky. He often
stayed at the Russell YMCA and had rented a room there by the
week. He and the passenger had been dating for about a year
at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on a planned
trip from Russell to Columbus, Ohio, and the parties were to
return to Russell that evening. Ohio has a guest statute, which
would have barred recovery here.5 Kentucky allows the passenger
to recover against the host on the basis of ordinary negligence.'
The lower court held that Ohio law applied on the issue of guest-
host immunity and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. A divided Court of Appeals held that Kentucky law
should apply and reversed. In so doing it gave further impetus
to the process of what I have called judicial method and the
policy-centered conflict of laws.
7
The essential thesis of judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws is that courts should deal with conflicts problems
on a case by case basis with reference to considerations of policy
and fairness to the parties. This means that a court should ap-
proach a conflicts case as it would any other, that it should decide
the case before it in light of the particular fact-law patterns
presented, that the decision should be based upon considerations
of policy and fairness to the parties, and that in time a body of
decisional law will emerge providing guidelines for the resolution
4 The term "resided," as used here, means domiciled.
5 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1965). The statute required a
showing of "wilfull or wanton misconduct," and the plaintiff had only alleged
ordinary and gross negligence.
0 The legislature had enacted a guest statute, but it was held to be violative of
the state constitution. Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
7 See generally Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3; Sedler,
Characterization, Identification of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Con-
flict of Laws: An Exercise in judicial Method, 2 RurTGERS-CAMDEN L. REv. 8
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Sedler Characterization]; Sedler, The Territorial Im-
perative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQUESNE
L. REv. 394 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, The Territorial Imperative].
811y "fact-law pattern" I mean the factual contacts that could give rise to an
interest on the part of the involved states and the differing laws of these states.
The "fact-law" pattern must be distinguished from the "facts of a case." In the
ordinary accident case the factual contacts that could give rise to an interest are
the residence of the plaintiff, the residence of the defendant, the place where the
accident occurred, and the place where the wrongful act .occurred if that differs
from the place of the accident.
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of future cases. In the area of the conflict of laws I fear that the
courts have been all too willing to abandon the approach of
judicial method for "academic solutions of universal application,"
and I have elsewhere discussed what I believe to be the cause of
this phenomenon.'0 Until rather recently it was fair to say that
the "law" of the conflict of laws was not the result of judicial
decisions in particular cases and the development of principles
for future application. Instead, from the "traditional rules ap-
proach" of the original Restatement,1 to what I have called the
"modern rules approach" of the Restatement (Second),12 the courts
have been willing to accept "externally imposed solutions" to
conflicts problems, and even where the courts are following an
approach based on considerations of policy and fairness, as many
now are, there is still the concern with developing "rules" to be
applied to future cases that have not yet arisen."' There is still
the reluctance to deal with each case as it arises for fear of ren-
dering "meaningless ad hoc decisions." 4 It is my submission,
however, that the proper use of judicial method in conflicts cases,
as in any other area of law, will produce sound results in the par-
ticular case before the court and will provide guidelines for resolv-
ing future cases.15 I think that this is well-demonstrated by Ken-
tucky's approach to choice of law in interstate automobile acci-
dent cases.
In Wessling v. Paris,'0 decided in 1967, Kentucky abandoned
the "traditional rules approach," which looked to the "law of the
place of the wrong" in conflicts torts cases. The Court was there
faced with the situation of two Kentucky residents who were
involved in an automobile accident in Indiana, which had a guest
statute. It recognized that only Kentucky had an interest in
applying its law on this issue and proceeded to apply that law.
9 See the discussion of the "academic solution of universal application" in
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3, at 30-41.
10 Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3, at 53-57.
"L This was followed in Kentucky until the decision in Wessling.
12 See the discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3,
at 61-62; Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Anal-
ysis and a Critique, 72 CoLum. L. REv. 279, 284-86 (1972). Cf. Reese, Choice of
Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972).
'3 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
14See the discussion of "Meaningless ad hoc decisions m D. CAvERs, THE
CHoicE-oF-LAw PRocEss 121-22 (1965).
15 See the discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3,
at 129-30.
16417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
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Whether the purpose of a guest statute is to protect a host from
suit by an "ungrateful guest"-which is most questionable today
17
-or to protect the hoses insurer from collusive suits or simply to
exclude this class of cases from recovery (thereby possibly lower-
ing insurance rates or more likely increasing insurance companies'
profits),'18 the only state interested in applying its law on that
question is the defendant's home state, where the vehicle is in-
sured 9 and where the consequences of imposing liability will be
felt.20 Where that state has decided to prefer the injured pas-
senger and the plaintiff is a resident of that state, it has a clear
interest in applying its law to permit recovery.2' By the same
token, the state where the injury occurred has no interest in
applying its law to permit a non-resident defendant and his
insurer to escape liability. In terms of interest analysis22 Wessling
17 Since there will almost always have been a pre-existing relationship be-
tween the parties, and since the host's liability is covered by insurance, the host
would ordinarily want the guest to recover. While the concern with protecting
the host may have been a purpose of a guest statute at the time of its enactment,
it is difficult to see this as the purpose today. See the discussion of this point in
Trautman 67 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 468-72 (1967). However, in terms of interest
analysis, the protection of the host would still be considered a legitimate legislative
purpose. See the discussion of legitimate legislative purpose in B. CuluE, Survival
of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in SELEcTED
EssAYs ON =HE CoN-FrLIar OF LAws 129, 143-44 (1963).
18 Whether the existence of a guest statute will reduce insurance rates is highly
questionable. See the discussion in Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial
Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574-77 (1961).
10 Insurance rates are based on loss experience in a territory of insureds. See
the discussion in Morris, supra note 18, at 567-69. The accident will be charged
to the loss experience of drivers in the defendants home state irrespective of
where it occurs, and recovery will affect the profits of the insurer's business in that
state.
20 The interest of the defendant's home state in protecting him from liability
is more clear where the defendant is an entrepreneur, and the liability would have
to be met or distributed by the enterprise, or if there is insurance, a judgment
against him might significantly affect his future insurance rates. In such a case,
particularly where the defendant may have conformed his conduct to the require-
ments of his home state's laws, there is a question of unfairness in holding the
defendant to the higher standard imposed by the law of another state. See Barrett
v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
21 Interest analysis, however, does not mean that a state necessarily has an
interest in protecting its own resident. A state's interest is in applying its law to
implement the policy reflected in that law, and in a given case this may mean an
interest in protecting a non-resident against its own resident. See, e.g., Gaither v.
Meyers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (D.C. law applied to allow Maryland
plaintiff to recover against D.C. defendant, who left the keys in his automobile in
D.C.); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (New
York faw imposing vicarious liability against the former owner of a vehicle who
failed to transfer the registration applied in favor of a New Jersey plaintiff who
was injured by the driver of the vehicle); Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Day-
strom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576 (1969) (New York Statute of Frauds
applied to bar recovery by New York broker against New Jersey corporation).
22 My use of interest analysis, of course, is based on the approach of the late
iContinued on next page)
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presented a false conflict, and Kentucky law should apply as the
law of the only interested state.2  Unless the forum remains com-
mitted to the "traditional rules approach," 24 it will apply its own
law to allow recovery, and in the unlikely event that the suit is
brought in the state of injury, it too should apply the law of the
parties' home state.25
In Arnett v. Thompson the Court was faced with the reverse
side of the coin: Ohio spouses traveling in the same vehicle were
involved in an accident in Kentucky. Ohio has a guest statute and
recognizes spousal immunity; neither defense is available under
Kentucky law. This is not necessarily the same case as Wessling.
The parties' home state is, of course, interested in applying its
law to allow the defense. However, here, unlike the situation in
Wessling, the state of injury may have an interest in applying its
law to allow recovery to a non-resident plaintiff. It has been con-
tended that such an interest is present because the plaintiff might
become a public charge on that state if he does not recover or he
may have incurred debts to resident medical creditors, which can
only be satisfied from the proceeds of tort recovery.28 It has also
been contended that the general compensatory policy of the state
of injury should be applied in favor of all persons injured within
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Professor Brainerd Currie. See generally B. CumuE, SELEcrED ESSAYS ON THE CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS (1963). This should not be confused with Professor Bobert Leflar's
choice-influencing consideration of "advancement of the forum's governmental
interests," which looks to the "total governmental interest" and is not related to
the forum's interest in applying its own law. See Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on
Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAI-w. L. REv. 1584, 1587 (1966). How-
ever, when the courts purport to apply Professor Leflar's choice-influencing con-
sideration, they tend to employ the concept of interest analysis that was developed
by Professor Currie. See, e.g., Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.
Wis. 1968).
23 Tis would be true whenever two parties from a recovery state are involved
in an accident in an immunity state irrespective of the nature of the immunity. See
the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra note 7, at 49-61.
24 See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Holder v. Holder,
384 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1962), Oshiek v. Oshiek, 136 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. 1964).
25 See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1968). But see Schlitz v.
Meyer, 280 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1972), where in a suit between two Kentucky resi-
dents who were involved in an accident in Ohio, the Ohio court held that it was
required to apply the legislative policy represented by the Ohio guest statute to
any accident that occurred in that state.
26 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
27 And will do so if the suit is brought there. See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa,
213 N.E.2d 544 (IMI. 1966); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968);
McSwain v. McSwain, 215 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1966). See also DeFoor v. Lematta, 437
P.2d 107 (Ore. 1968).28 See B. CtnuRm, supra note 17, at 366-72.
JuDICiAL MEraOD IS "ALIVE AND WELL"
its borders.29 But obviously this interest, even if it is found to
exist, is not nearly as strong as the forum's interest in allowing
recovery to a resident plaintiff, and the commentators and the
courts are clearly divided on how this case should be resolved.30
My own view is that the state of injury has no real interest in
applying its law here and that it should defer to the policy of
the parties' home state.31 In this day and age the accident victim
will get back home, -3 2 and the social and economic consequences
of the accident will be felt in his home state. He will not become
a public charge in the state of injury. The purpose of tort recovery
is not to provide reimbursement for medical creditors, since medi-
cal loss forms such a small part of the total recovery. The only
real interest I see here is with the parties' home state, and in my
view its law, denying recovery, should be applied.
In Arnett, the Kentucky Court of Appeals came down on the
side of the injured plaintiff and held that Kentucky law should
apply."3 I have always felt that the primary reason for the Court's
decision in Arnett was the realization that the parties, although
Ohio residents, were "Kentuckians at heart." This was indicated
to me by the first sentence in the opinion, which says, "Carl A.
Arnett and Edna, his wife, residents of Ohio, while visiting rela-
tives in Kentucky were involved in an automobile accident....
The accident happened in the eastern part of the state, and to
anyone familiar with the social and economic conditions pre-
29 See D. CAvmis, supra note 14, at 143-45.
30 See the discussion of the views of various commentators in Sedler, Babcock
v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3, at 121-23. See also Rosenberg, Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 459 (1967). Compare the majority and
dissenting views in Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1968), and the
decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d
781 (N.H. 1966), with its decision in Gagne v. Berry, 290 A.2d 624 (N.H. 1972).
31 the discussion in Sedler, Characterization, supra note 7, at 64-65. My
view as to real interests differs somewhat from Professor Currie's use of interest
analysis in that I think Professor Currie tended to look to hypothetical interests.
See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Symposium-Conflict of Laws Roundtable:
The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEx. L. REv. 224, 225 (1971). Generally
in the case of an interstate automobile accident where the parties are from the
same state, I favor the application of the state's law either way.3 2 Unlike the situation that perhaps existed at an earlier period with respect
to injured workmen who were temporarily present in the forum as reflected in
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), and
Alaska Packers Assn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).33 And in so doing rejected my view that Kentucky should displace its own
law here. 433 S.W.2d at 113. While such rejection is "personally painful," it
accords with my position that courts should not give undue weight to the opinions
of academic commentators.
34 433 S.W.2d at 112.
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vailing there, no more need be said. Large numbers of eastern
Kentuckians have emigrated to the cities of Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana and elsewhere to find employment, which is not available
in the heart of Appalachia's poverty belt. But they retain their
ties to eastern Kentucky and consider themselves "Kentuckians at
heart."35 On week-ends and holidays many of them return home,
as demonstrated by the traffic on Interstate-75 south from Cincin-
nati on any Friday evening. On Sunday evening the jam-up is on
Interstate-75 north. The Arnetts were no exception, as my further
research for the preparation of this article disclosed. Carl Arnett
was a native Kentuckian, who went to Ohio to get a job. The
Arnetts returned to Kentucky almost every weekend, and what is
even more interesting, they did not go back to Ohio after the
accident. 36 The fact that the parties stayed in Kentucky might
have justified the application of Kentucky law on the ground that
a court may properly consider post-accident changes in resi-
dence.3 7 However, I think that the Court was equally concerned
with protecting other "Kentuckians at heart," who would return
to Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and other states after the accident.
And it may have been that the Court also believed that all non-
residents injured in Kentucky should recover under its law. In
any event, in Arnett the Court decided the question before it and
held that whenever two non-residents were involved in an acci-
dent in Kentucky, Kentucky law, allowing recovery against a host
and against a spouse, would apply.
In Arnett the Court also set forth guidelines for future cases
presenting conflicts torts problems. 8 Rejecting any weighing of
the conflicting interests of the concerned states,39 and also re-
jecting the state of the most significant relationship test of the
35 1 also understand that many of these persons return to Kentucky in the
event they lose their jobs.
361 obtained this information from the attorney for Edna Arnett.
37 See the discussion in COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 249-53. The courts
are ambivalent about the propriety of taking post-accident changes of residence
into account. Compare Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.. 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.
1967) and Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967), with Miller v.
Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968).
38 It may be queried whether this approach will be employed fully in other
areas of choice oflaw. As to the use of judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws in other areas, see the discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in
Kentuck!y, supra note 3, at 130.
3aWhich Professor Currie says cannot be done in the case of a true conflict.
B. Cumux, Notes on Methods and Objections in the Conflict of Laws, in S=LCTED
EssAys ON =H CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 181-82 (1963).
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Restatement (Second),40 the Court said that Kentucky law should
apply whenever "Kentucky has enough contacts to justify apply-
ing Kentucky law."41 It found that such contacts were present in
Wessling since the parties were Kentucky residents and the only
contact with another state was that the accident happened there.
However, in Arnett it found that the fact that the accident hap-
pened in Kentucky was also sufficient, even though the parties
were non-residents.42 Thus, at the time of Arnett, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals had dealt with two fact-law patterns, the one
where two Kentuckians were involved in an accident in an
immunity state and the one where two residents of an immunity
state were involved in an accident in Kentucky. In both cases
it held that Kentucky law allowing recovery would apply, and in
so holding it developed the sufficient contacts test for application
in future cases.
Foster v. Leggett involved still a different fact-law pattern,
and the Court's approach in that case demonstrates very clearly
how a court, proceeding in the common law tradition of deciding
only the case before it while at the same time developing prin-
ciples susceptible of future application, handles a new case.
Foster was like Wessling in that the plaintiff was a Kentucky
resident and the accident occurred in another state, but differed
from Wessling in that here the defendant resided in an immunity
state, in which the accident occurred. It was like Arnett in that
the defendant was from an immunity state, but differed from
Arnett in that the plaintiff was from a recovery state and the
accident occurred in the defendant's home state. In terms of
interest analysis it differed from both cases in that here a true
conflict was clearly presented, since the plaintiff was from a
recovery state and the defendant was from an immunity state.43
40 The rejection of the REsTATmENT (SEcoND) test was made clear in Foster
o. Leggett.
4J 433 S.W.2d at 113.
42 The Court stated: "The fact that we will apply Kentucky law where Ken-
tucky people have an accident in Ohio or Indiana does not require that we apply
Ohio or Indiana law where people of one of those states have an accident here,
because the basis of the application is not a weighing of contacts but simply the
existence of enough contacts with Kentucky to warrant applying our law." 433
S.W.2d at 113.
43 The fact that the injury occurred in a guest statute state does not give that
state an interest in having its law applied to deny recovery. The interest is present
only where the defendant is also a resident of the state. See the discussion of this
point in Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856 n.2 (Pa. 1970).
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Although the fact-law pattern and the analysis of interests in
Foster differed from those in Wessling and Arnett, the principle
of sufficient contacts that the Court had developed in those cases
was applicable to provide a basis for decision. The Court stated:
When the court has jurisdiction of the parties its primary
responsibility is to follow its own substantive law. The basic
law is the law of the forum, which should not be displaced
without valid reasons. 44 We have not, therefore, tried to adopt
a rule, or rules, for all cases of this kind which may come
before us.
In the case at bar, contacts with Kentucky were numerous
and significant. Decedent was a lifelong resident of Kentucky.
While appellee was a resident of Ohio, he kept a rented room
near his work in Kentucky, stayed in it on the average of two
nights per week and all his employment and most of his social
relationships were in Kentucky. The fatal journey began in
Kentucky and was to have been concluded in Kentucky.
So we conclude that the reasons appellee here advances,
that the accident occurred in the state of Ohio and that ap-
pellee was domiciled and had a residence in that state, are not
sufficient in view of the contacts the state of Kentucky had
with the parties to justify the displacement of the law of this
forum with the law of the state of Ohio. We are now reaffirm-
ing our position taken in Wessling v. Paris, supra, that if there
are significant contacts-not necessarily the most significant
contacts-with Kentucky, the Kentucky law should be ap-
plied.
4
5
Three judges dissented, two on the ground that Kentucky should
follow the Restatement (Second) state of the most significant
relationship test,4 6 which they believed would clearly lead to the
application of Ohio law on the issue of guest-host immunity,47
and one on the ground that Kentucky should never have aban-
doned the "place of the wrong" rule.48
44 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky,
supra note 3, at 87-88.
45 484 S.W.2d at 829.
4
6 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLICT oF LAWS § 175 (1969). 484 S.W.2d at
831.
47 Professor Reese, the Reporter for the ESATEMEr (SEcoNn), is not as
certain. See the discussion in Reese, The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law:
A Critique, 61 Ky. L.J. 368 (1972).
48 484 S.W.2d at 829. This was the basis of Judge Osborne's dissent in
Wessling.
[Vol. 61
JUDICIAL METHOD IS "ALIVE AND WELL"
Wessling, Arnett and Foster, taken together, establish the fol-
lowing: (1) in conflicts torts cases Kentucky will apply its own
law so long as there are sufficient contacts with Kentucky to
justify application of that law; and (2) on the basis of this
approach Kentucky law applies, at least with respect to issues of
guest-host and spousal immunity, 49 whenever: (a) both parties
are Kentucky residents, although the accident occurred in another
state; (b) the accident occurred in Kentucky, although the
parties are both non-residents; and (c) the plaintiff is a Kentucky
resident and the defendant and/or the trip resulting in the acci-
dent had factual connections with Kentucky.
It is now important, I think, to analyze further the sufficient
contacts test that has been developed in these cases. Left un-
answered under that formulation is whether Kentucky law would
also apply in a case involving the same fact-law pattern and the
same conflicting interests, as in Foster, but where the same kind
of factual contacts were not present.50 Let me posit such a case.
Suppose that Mrs. Foster met Mr. Leggett at a party in Ports-
mouth, Ohio, and they went out to dinner together afterwards.
Mr. Leggett was driving her back to the home of friends in
Portsmouth with whom she was staying when the accident oc-
curred. Let us also assume that Mr. Leggett worked in Ports-
mouth instead of Russell and that he only rarely came into Ken-
tucky. The fact-law pattern here is the same as that in Foster v.
Leggett: the plaintiff is from a recovery state, the defendant is
from an immunity state, the accident occurred in the defendant's
49 In my view this applies not only to all claims of immunity, but to all ques-
tions of tort liability.
50 Almost identical factual contacts were present in Bennett v. Macy, 324 F.
Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971), involving a Kentucky plaintiff and an Indiana
defendant, and Judge Bratcher correctly forecast Foster in holding that Kentucky
would apply its own law. Likewise, on very similar facts, in Schneider v. Nichols,
158 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1968), Minnesota applied its law to allow a Minnesota
plaintiff to recover against a North Dakota defendant.
However, where such contacts with the plaintiff's home state were absent, the
courts have refused to apply that state's law and have sustained the defense. See
Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970); Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272
(2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968),
where the accident occurred in the defendant's home state, which had a wrongful
death limitation, but the defendant subsequently moved to the decedent's home
state. The suit was brought in the decedent's home state, and the court there
refused to recognize the limitation. It emphasized the defendants subsequent
change of residence, and the decision has been explained on this ground. See CoM-
MENTARY, supra note 2, at 252-53. My own view of Miller is somewhat different,
and as will be seen, I disagree with the results in Cipolla and Pryor. See Sedler,
The Territorial Imperative, supra note 7, at 397-403.
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home state. But here any factual connection with Kentucky
other than the residence of the plaintiff is absent.
In speaking of such a case Professor Weintraub states:
Suppose that the Kentucky plaintiff was a pedestrian crossing
an Ohio street when she was struck by an automobile driven
by an Ohio resident. Assume that on one or more issues the
Kentucky rules of liability and compensation are more favor-
able to the injured pedestrian than the Ohio rules. Even if the
Ohio driver can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Ken-
tucky courts, by, for example, being served with process while
temporarily present in Kentucky, Kentucky law should not be
applied. Assertion of the Kentucky compensation interest
based solely on the residence of the plaintiff and without
any other connection between Kentucky and the defendant or
the occurrence would be chauvinistic. 51
In the guest statute situation Professor Weintraub would allow
the plaintiff's home state to apply its law when the accident
occurred in the defendant's home state only if the trip had begun
in the plaintiff's state or was to end there, 2 and thus he would
hold that Kentucky law should not apply in the example I have
given. Many other commentators would agree.3 If the sufficient
contacts test means factual contacts with Kentucky, then it would
seem that the Kentucky Court would likewise deny recovery here.
It is my submission that Kentucky law should apply both in
the example that I have given and the example of Professor Wein-
traub, and it is for this reason that I want to analyze the sufficient
contacts test more carefully. I too had once paid obeisance to
the need for factual contacts with the forum,54 but am now con-
vinced that this is merely a "territorial hang-up" and that conflicts
torts problems should be resolved without reference to the "ter-
ritorial imperative."55 I will now try to develop this point more
51 Weintraub, Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule: The Ken-
tucky Experience, 61 Ky. L.J. 419 (1972).
52 COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 248-49.
53 See generally the various discussions in Symposium on Cipolla v. Shaposka-
An Application of "Interest Analysis," 9 DuQu-sNE L. RBv. 347 et seq. (1971).
54"This much of the tenitorial principle seemingly remains, that a state may
not apply its law solely on the ground that the plaintiff is a resident of that state.
If defendant did nothing in the forum, the causing of an injury to the forum's
resident in another state would not be a sufficient constitutional contact to justify
the forum's applying its own law." Sedler, Characterization, supra note 7, at 68.
See also Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 3, at 127-28.
55 Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 7, at 397-98.
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fully and in the process will suggest a different explanation of the
suflcient contacts test.
It may first be well to ask how Foster v. Leggett got before
the Kentucky courts. If it is true, as I have maintained, that courts
which are committed to a policy-centered approach are likely
to apply their own law in the case of a true conflict,5" the plaintiff
will want to bring the suit in his home state. In Foster, since the
accident occurred in Ohio, jurisdiction in Kentucky could not be
sustained on the basis of a "long-arm" act. We are informed in
the opinion that the defendant was before the Kentucky courts on
the basis of personal service. Since he worked in Kentucky, he
probably could not have avoided such service even if he wanted
to do so. But, of course, he did not want to avoid service. Because
of the prior relationship between the parties in Foster and in all
the conflicts guest statute cases which have arisen-the fictitious
"ungrateful hitchhiker" has yet to make his appearance in an
actual case 57-the host very likely wants the injured passenger to
recover and will allow himself to be served in the passenger's
home state.58 Indeed it is this prior relationship which is the
justification most commonly advanced for guest statutes today-
a higher standard of liability is necessary to prevent collusion
between the guest and the host against the host's insurer. We
may assume in our example, therefore, that the host will allow
himself to be served in Kentucky.
59
What this points out is that a guest-host suit, as most personal
injury actions, is in reality not a suit between the victim and the
nominal defendant, but, as everyone knows, between the victim
and the defendant's insurer. If this were frankly acknowledged,
there would be no problem as to jurisdiction. Since most auto-
mobile liability insurance companies are national concerns, the
insurance company will very likely be doing business in the plain-
56 See the discussion in Sedler, Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Symposium, 57
IowA L. REv. 1229 1234-38 (1972).
57 Although I have not checked this out, I would imagine that this is equally
true in the non-conflict guest-host cases as well.58 1n Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970), the nominal defendant
was served in the plaintiff's home state when they were playing golf together. It
takes no feat of immagination to assume that this was prearranged. See the discus-
sion of this point in Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 7, at 400-01.
59 The example given by Professor Weintraub assumes the absence of a prior
relationship between the parties, which is not likely in the guest-host situation.
See also the examples given in Weintraub, Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Sympo-
sium, supra note 56, at 1261-64.
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tiff's home state. If the state had a direct action statute, 0 or the
insurer were otherwise subject to suit in the forum because of
the insurance relationship, 61 there would be no problem as to
jurisdiction and it would not be necessary to resort to pre-arranged
service. In any event, it is the insurance company's lawyer who
will assert the guest statute defense. If the purpose of a guest
statute were really to protect the host from suits by ungrateful
guests, 2 the host should be able to decide whether to assert the
defense and he should be able to refuse to assert it without
jeopardizing his claim of liability protection against the insurer.
Of course, this is not the way it is.
However, once it is recognized that the controversy is between
the plaintiff and the nominal defendant's insurer, it is clear that
there is no unfairness in holding the insurer to the higher standard
of the plaintiff's home state. The existence of a guest statute in
the insured's home state will affect insurance rates only pe-
ripherally if at all. 3 Since the insurance must cover all accidents
irrespective of where they occur, there would be liability if the
accident occurred in the plaintiff's home state and the insurer
would not be "unfairly surprised" if it is held liable when the
accident occurred on the other side of the state line. 4 If further
6
0
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 204.30(4) (Supp. 1972).
01 New York allows suit to be brought against the insured defendant by the
attachment of the insurance policy obligation of the insurer to defend the action.
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). On this basis suit can
he brought in New York without personal service where the accident occurred in
another state. See Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
62 See note 17, supra.
03 See note 18, supra.
64 As Professor Weintraub has pointed out:
If the defendant is insured, the one who will pay is the liability insurer.
It would be more in accord with the facts to speak in terms of surprise
to the insurance company. If this is done, then the surprise argument
may all but disappear. Insurance actuaries do not base rates upon indi-
vidual cases, but upon great numbers of cases. That a bizarre event
will occur in a given case is unlikely, but that it will not occur in a
hundred thousand cases is equally unlikely. Moreover, in setting in-
surance rates, the 'incurred losses! that are used in computation include
not only paid losses but also 'loss reserves'. The amount of the loss reserve
for a particular accident is the amount of probable eventual payment as
estimated by the insurer's claim department during the 'accident year' in
which the injury occurs and before payment. The loss reserve is then re-
viewed and adjusted from time to time in the light of subsequent events
until final payment of the claim. The premium set is designed to produce
a five percent underwriting profit in addition to investment income,
taking into account all costs, including loss reserves and a 'trend factor'
that anticipates continuing inflation in settlement costs. In short, to talk
of 'surprising' the insurer is very likely to be talking nonsense. Com-
mr=An', supra note 2, at 205-06.
JuDiciAL METoD Is "ALIVE AND WELL"
justification is needed, it can be found in the fact that the insur-
ance company does business in the plaintiff's home state and on
a "benefit theory," that state can hold the company to its standard
of liability whenever one of its residents is injured elsewhere by
the company's insured.65
The point that I am making is that the forum is justified in
applying its law whenever it has an interest in doing so and
when the application of its law will not produce fundamental
unfairness or defeat the legitimate expectations of the other party.
In the ordinary automobile accident case the "interest and fair-
ness" test that I am proposing justifies the plaintiff's home state's
application of its law to allow recovery. The fact of the plaintiff's
residency gives it an interest in applying its law, since the social
and economic consequences of the accident will be felt there,
and the application of its law is not unfair to the nominal defen-
dant (who in the guest-host situation at least will want the plain-
tiff to recover) nor to his insurer.66 There is nothing "chau-
vinistic" about the forum's applying its own law in the case of a
true conflict,67 and it should do so when no unfairness to the
other party results. It is time to abandon the "territorial impera-
tive" in interstate automobile accidents and to approach the con-
flicts problems resulting from such accidents in terms of interest
and fairness. In the ordinary automobile accident case this justi-
fies the application of the forum's law allowing recovery.
I come back then to the sufficient contacts test that the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has developed and ask whether the Court
is really setting forth a requirement of factual contacts. The
sufficient contacts test could be interpreted as a shorthand way
of saying that Kentucky will apply its own law whenever it has
an interest in doing so and the application of its law is not unfair
to either party or his insurer. The results in Wessling, Arnett and
65 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra
note 7, at 406-07.
66 Cf. Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971),
where it could be argued that it would be unfair to hold the landowner to a differ-
ent standard of care to persons coming on the land than was required by the
law of the state where the land was situate. On the other band, in Miller v. Miller,
22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968), the New York court in denying the Maine
insurer the benefit of the Maine limitation on wrongful death recovery, emphasized
that automobile liability policies did not distinguish between liability for personal
injuries and liability for wrongful death, so that there could have been no
"reliance" on the Maine limitation. 237 N.E.2d at 881-82.6 7 Its interest is the same irrespective of the factual contacts with the forum.
19731
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
Foster are fully consistent with this explanation. In all of these
cases, Kentucky saw an interest in applying its law to allow the
plaintiff to recover,68 and in all of these cases the application of
Kentucky law produced no unfairness toward the nominal defen-
dant (who wanted the plaintiff to recover) or toward the insurer.
Kentucky should also apply its law to implement the policy of
compensation reflected in that law whenever a Kentucky plaintiff
has been injured in another state by a resident of that state who
is insured by an insurance company doing business in Kentucky. 9
In Foster the Court observed that: "When the court has juris-
diction of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own
substantive law. The basic law is the law of the forum, which
should not be displaced without valid reasons." 70 Obeisance to
the "territorial imperative," it is submitted, is not a valid reason
to displace Kentucky laws when Kentucky has a real interest in
the application of its law and no unfairness results from such
application. When faced with the question, it is hoped that the
Kentucky Court will define "sufficient contacts" as "interest and
fairness" and will abandon territorialism once and for all. The
thrust of its decisions thus far would appear to lead in that
direction.
What stands out most clearly in Foster and in the cases that
have preceded it is that in deciding conflicts torts cases the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has been proceeding in accordance with
the best principles of judicial method. It has decided each case
with reference to the fact-law pattern presented and has based
its decision upon considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties. It has avoided unnecessary generalizations and has re-
sisted the temptation to formulate "rules" for cases that have not
yet arisen.71 And yet from its decision guidelines for the resolu-
tion of future cases have emerged. It has demonstrated very
effectively that the common law tradition of judicial method is
"alive and well" in the conflict of laws.
6 8 In Arnett the interest was seen as applying to non-resident plaintiffs in-
jured in Kentucky.69 In the unlikely event that the insurance company was not doing business in
Kentucky, I would still allow suit in Kentucky and the application of Kentucky
law if the parties resided in a functional socio-economic and mobility area that
included Kentucky. See the discussion in Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra
note 7, at 407-10.
70 484 S.W.2d at 829.
71 As the New York court did not do in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121,
286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
